Signing

Every client and provider action carries an EIP-712 signature from the acting party. reclaim and the curation functions are the only unsigned entry points. Freshness and replay rules are on Security model.

DomainsCopy Anchor Link

Each contract has its own domain:

EIP712Domain(string name,string version,uint256 chainId,address verifyingContract)

DOMAIN_SEPARATOR is computed once in the constructor. Each contract exposes EIP712_NAME, EIP712_VERSION, DOMAIN_SEPARATOR and ERC-5267 eip712Domain() (fields = 0x0f, no salt, no extensions). Read the domain from the contract and check that the separator rebuilt from eip712Domain() equals DOMAIN_SEPARATOR; a mismatch means a wrong address or chain. Published separators are on Deployments.

Digest and signature formatCopy Anchor Link

digest = keccak256(0x19 0x01 || DOMAIN_SEPARATOR || hashStruct(message))
sig    = r || s || v     // 65 bytes, v = 27 or 28

Any other length or v recovers address(0), which every entry point refuses. s is not range-checked; sign with low s.

Type stringsCopy Anchor Link

Members are encoded in declaration order. The strings below are byte-exact (no spaces after commas).

JobRegistry (VORQ Jobs)Copy Anchor Link

Order(bytes32 c,uint32 modelId,uint32 slaSecs,uint128 rateIn,uint128 rateOut,uint32 unitsIn,uint32 unitsOut,uint32 designated,uint64 expiresAt)
Claim(bytes32 jobId,uint64 issuedAt)
Settle(bytes32 jobId,uint32 completionTok,uint64 issuedAt)
Fail(bytes32 jobId,uint64 issuedAt)
Cancel(bytes32 jobId,uint64 issuedAt)

Order fields:

Not signed: the Solidity Order struct's tenth member taskCid, the authSig argument of post, and the resultCid argument of submitAndSettle. See unsigned parameters.

ProviderRegistry (VORQ Providers)Copy Anchor Link

RequestCapacity(uint32 n,uint64 issuedAt)
SetIdentity(bytes32 boxKey,bytes evidence,uint64 issuedAt)

Signed by the provider operator. evidence is dynamic and is encoded as keccak256(evidence).

AskRegistry (VORQ Asks)Copy Anchor Link

Ask(uint32 modelId,uint32 sla,uint128 rateIn,uint128 rateOut)
AskSnapshot(uint32 providerId,uint64 signedAt,Ask[] quotes)Ask(uint32 modelId,uint32 sla,uint128 rateIn,uint128 rateOut)

Signed by the operator of providerId. The second line is the full encoded type hashed into SNAPSHOT_TYPEHASH. quotes is encoded as keccak256 of the concatenated hashStruct(Ask) values in array order, so reordering quotes changes the digest.

TypehashesCopy Anchor Link

Payment authorization (EIP-3009)Copy Anchor Link

Escrow is pulled with the payment token's receiveWithAuthorization. The client signs it before post, post stores it, and claim executes it once. It is signed on the token's domain:

domain = { name: token.name(), version: token.version(), chainId, verifyingContract: <token address> }
ReceiveWithAuthorization(address from,address to,uint256 value,uint256 validAfter,uint256 validBefore,bytes32 nonce)

Typehash: 0xd099cc98ef71107a616c4f0f941f04c322d8e254fe26b3c6668db87aae413de8.

• A wrong value surfaces as a token revert inside claim, not at post.
• Only the payee (to == msg.sender) can execute a receive authorization, so the signature in public post calldata can be spent only by the JobRegistry.
• validBefore is expiresAt + 1 because the token requires block.timestamp < validBefore while claim accepts block.timestamp == expiresAt.
• nonce = jobId makes the authorization single-use and bound to one job. The nonce does not include the registry address.
• A stored authorization cannot be replaced.
• Read the token's name and version on chain. For Base Sepolia USDC they are USDC and 2.

Test vectorsCopy Anchor Link

vectors/signing-v3.json holds domains, typed data, digests, signers and signatures for every type above plus the payment authorization, computed at the local fork addresses on chain id 84532 with Anvil's public dev keys. The file also carries vectors for off-chain VORQ message types that no contract verifies. Verify an EIP-712 signature walks through one case.